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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In reversing New York's highest court, the Supreme Court cited the
case of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabanza,7 4 and held that regardless of whether a state
acts through its legislature (as in the first phase of this case), or through its
judiciary (as in the present phase), it is still the application of state power
to religious matters, and is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Those cases which are concerned only with whether a given action of a
state or the Federal government violates the Constitution are usually difficult
of decision. Therefore when a case is compounded by the entrance of a foreign
government into the picture (especially that of the Soviet Union) in addition
to a state or the Federal government, the decision is made even more difficult.
While the competing interests of this case, i.e., checking the influence of com-
munism on the one hand and preserving separation of church and state on the
other, may incline one to choose the former at the expense of the latter, the
correctness of the view taken by the Supreme Court is best expressed by Justice
Reed in the Kedroff case and by Chief Judge Desmond dissenting in the present
case.
Justice Reed stated that 'Legislative power to punish subversion cannot
be doubted. If such action should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither
his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense."75
In a parenthetical remark, Chief Judge Desmond said, "(Rejection by our
courts of the Patriarch's nominee for the archbishopric is the same kind of
interference with religion of which we accuse the Soviet authorities) .1
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CONTRACTS
RECORDING REQUIREMENT OF AGREEMENTS INVOLVING MOTION PICTURE AND
ALLIED RIGHTS
A copyright may be assigned, conveyed, or mortgaged.1 Every assignment
of a copyright must be recorded in the United States Copyright Office. If an
assignment is not recorded, it is void as against a subsequent purchaser or
assignee who pays valuable consideration for the copyright without notice of
the first assignment.2 In the case of Vidor v. Serlin,3 the principal issue con-
fronting the Court of Appeals was whether the second assignment of a copy-
right, which had been recorded pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Section 28, took priority
over a previous agreement which had not been recorded. The trial court held
that the plaintiff, the subsequent assignee, was the sole and exclusive owner
74. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
75. Supra note 63 at 109.
76. Supra note 61 at 220, 196 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1959).
1. 17 U.S.C. § 28.
2. 17 u.S.C. § 30. See Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co., Inc. v. Social Uplift Film
Corp., 220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
3. 7 N.Y.2d 502, 199 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1960).
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of the copyrighted work. The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
4
In 1954 the plaintiff contracted with Nijinsky for all of her rights in two
copyrighted books. Coupled with this contract, the plaintiff also received an
assignment of the same rights, and this document was properly recorded in the
United States Copyright Office. In 1940 Nijinsky hid entered into an agree-
ment with the defendant Bass to confer to him the motion picture and allied
rights in the copyright and to appoint him as her booking agent for a lecture
tour. Bass subsequently assigned his rights under the agreement to the defend-
ant Serlin, but neither of these agreements were recorded. The defendants
argued that the Nijinsky-Bass agreement was merely a license which did not
have to be recorded pursuant to the statute, and that the plaintiff took his
assignment with notice of the prior rights of the defendants.
The trial court found that the Nijinsky-Bass agreement as well as the
Bass-Serlin assignment should have been recorded. The Court of Appeals up-
held this finding and dismissed the argument that the Nijinsky-Bass agreement
was a mere license because of the express language in the agreement indicating
that it was an assignment. A book, a motion picture based on the book, or a
drama based on the book can each be copyrighted. Each of these copyrights
can be separately assigned and must be recorded to provide constructive notice
to subsequent assignees.5 In addition, testimony at the trial indicated a custom
of the motion picture industry to record all conveyances of motion picture rights.
Therefore, the failure of Bass to record his agreement with Nijinsky gave the
plaintiff priority in his claim, so long as the plaintiff had neither actual nor im-
plied notice of the defendants' rights in the books. The Court of Appeals found
that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had no
such notice.
The defendant Serlin, in addition to answering the plaintiff's claim, served
on Nijinsky a cross-complaint in which he requested damages from her for
having sold twice the rights in question. The trial court failed to pass on this
second issue, but held that the assignment from Bass to Serlin was ineffective.
The Appellate Division, in modifying the' judgment, dismissed the cross-com-
plaint, for the dramatic rights were not separately assignable without the
owner's consent,6 and there was not sufficient evidence to show consent or
ratification by Nijinsky. Whatever rights Serlin or his assignor might have
acquired were lost as a result of the breach of Bass' managerial obligations,-
in that no lecture tours were booked pursuant to the contract.
In affirming the modified judgment of the Appellate Division, the Court
of Appeals indicated that the consent of Nijinsky to the Bass-Serlin assign-
4. 7 A.D.2d 978, 184 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1st Dep't 1959).
5. Photo - Drama Motion Picture Co., Inc. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., supra note 2.
6. Delaware County v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U.S. 473, 488 (1889).
7. Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898 (1920).
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ment was indispensable. As to the necessity for consent, it is not entirely clear
from the opinion whether the Court proceeded on the theory that the contract
involved personal services, the hiring of Bass as a booking agent, or that the
contract conveying dramatic rights was of such a character that it was non-
assignable without the consent of the original owner.8 The fact that Bass did
nothing to secure lecture engagements and thereby breached his managerial
obligations is available not only to Nijinsky but also to the plaintiff and affords
another ground for giving priority to plaintiff's claimP
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL PAITNERSHp AGREEMENT
It is settled law in New York State that as between the statutory partner-
ship laws and a partnership agreement, the latter is controlling.10 From this
it follows that unless a partnership agreement establishes a different relation-
ship between the partners, a partner, upon dissolution of a partnership, is
entitled to what he would have received on dissolution under the Partnership
Laws.":
The Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Hunt, Hill and Betts,'2 construed a
partnership agreement. It held that the plaintiff, who withdrew from a law
firm located in New York City, was entitled not only to his share of the fees
paid to the firm prior to the date of withdrawal, but also to all fees earned
but unpaid, whether billed or unbilled, on the date of his withdrawal. This
decision reversed a judgment of the Appellate Division,' 3 dismissing plaintiff's
amended complaint. The Appellate Division had reversed an interlocutory
judgment entered upon a decision: by tie Supreme Court, 14 ordering an account-
ing in favor of plaintiff.
The decision of the court revolved around'whether the term "Net profits"
as used in the partnership agreement included fees that were earned but -un-
collected, or only such as were already collected by the firm at the time when
the partner withdrew.
The Court relied on the meaning the partnership agreement intended in
using the term "net profits." This term was defined as "net fees" less 10o
allocated to the capital account. "Net fees" in turn was defined under Arti-
cle Ill of the agreement as the balance remaining after expenses of the firm
incurred for that year were subtracted from the gross fees earned by the firm
for that year. This indicated to the court that "net fees" were determined on
8. Ibid.
9. Israel v. Wood DoLson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
10. In re Eddy, 290 N.Y. 677, 49 N.E.2d 628 (1943); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y.
32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939); Hermes v. Compton, 260 App. Div. 507, 23 N.Y.S.2d 126
(2d Dep't 1940).
11. N.Y. Partnership Law ch. 39, § 1 et seq.
12. 7 N.Y.2d 180, 196 N.YS.2d 647 (1959).
13. 4 A.D.2d 414, 187 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dep't 1959).
14. 12 Misc. 2d 797, 177 N.YS.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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